Schools and School Districts - Particular Torts in General - Legislative or Judicial Abrogation of School District\u27s Immunity in Tort by Abe, Theodore
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 43 Number 4 Article 12 
1967 
Schools and School Districts - Particular Torts in General - 
Legislative or Judicial Abrogation of School District's Immunity in 
Tort 
Theodore Abe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abe, Theodore (1967) "Schools and School Districts - Particular Torts in General - Legislative or Judicial 
Abrogation of School District's Immunity in Tort," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 43 : No. 4 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol43/iss4/12 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-PARTICULAR TORTS IN GENERAL-
LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT'S IMMUNITY
IN TORT-An action was brought in behalf of the minor plaintiff
against the school district and four of its employees for injuries
sustained in a fall down the steps of a high school while attending
classes. The plaintiffs alleged that the fall was due to the negligence
of the school district in maintaining the steps and that it was liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior On plaintiffs' appeal
from dismissal of the complaint as to the school district the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, with two dissents, held that a school district
was immune from tort liability in the performance of its govern-
mental functions. Dillon v York City School District, 422 Pa. 103,
220 A.2d 896 (1966)
The court's majority opinion recognized that the doctrine of
governmental immunity needed reform, but refused to abrogate
the rule because the issue was too complex for piecemeal judicial
reform and because the legislature normally determined public
policy A concurring opinion stated that the school district was
immune because it was an agency of the state and thus covered
by the same sovereign immunity that protected the state. However,
the dissent of Roberts, J stated that the case was decided not upon
its merits, but upon the issue of whether the doctrine "should be
abrogated by judicial action or retained as a matter more properly
to be dealt with by the Legislature."1 He asserted that legislative
review was unlikely due to the opposition of interest groups, and
that since the doctrine was estblished by judicial action, it could
be abrogated in the same manner The legislature would still be
free to act after the court withdrew from the area. Musmanno, J.,
in dissent, added that the court had no right to presume that the
legislature would assume a responsibility which resided in the
court and that postponing such responsibility only would perpetuate
the injustice. Thus the issue raised in this case is whether the
judiciary may abrogate the doctrine.
The instant case continues the line of precedent recognizing
the school districts' immunity, followed since it was established in
1. Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896, 899 (1966).
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Pennsylvania.2 In recent years the court has reaffirmed the rule, 3
although drawing the distinction between governmental and propri-
etary functions 4 in the attempt to limit immunity However, this
distinction has lead to another, holding that liability insurance did
not waive a school district's immunity to the extent of its coverage
since it received protection in proprietary functions.5 Although
dissatisfied with the rule, the court still applies it to municipal
corporations.' Members of the court have invited the legislature
to review the whole area of governmental immunities,7 but the
legislature has failed to respond." In an analogous situation because
of the legislature's inaction, the court in 1965 overruled the im-
munity of charitable organizations. 9 In light of such action and the
necessity for a more equitable resolution of the problem, the court
may in the future overrule the instant case despite the fact that
at present it considers the problem too complex.
Like Pennsylvania, the majority of jurisdictions have held that
a school district in the performance of its governmental functions
is not liable in tort in the absence of statute imposing such liability l0
It has been recognized that many different exceptions to the rule
have created varying and confusing applications in many juris-
dictions.1' Nevertheless, there is a trend toward the limitation and
abrogation of governmental immunity in general: witnessed by sta-
tute in the imposition of liability upon the federal government,=
and since 1957, by judicial abrogation as to the state"3 and political
subdivisions."4
This tort immunity of political subdivisions originated in Eng-
land in Russell v Men of Devon, 15 and was established in this
country'6 through judicial action. Russell was based upon the ra-
2. Ford v. School Dist., 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 (1888).
3. Shields v. School Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 184 A.2d 240 (1962) Michael v. School Dist.,
391 Pa. 209, 137 A.2d 456 (1958).
4. orris v. School Dist, 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958).
5. Supler v. School Dist., 407 :Pa. 657, 182 AK2d 535 (1962).
6. Graysneck v. Heard, 422 Pa. 111, 220 A.2d 893 (1966).
7. Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378, 381 (1960) (concurring opinion).
8. Graysneck v. Heard, supra note 6, at 894 n. 3.
9. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hisp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
10. E.g., Tesone v. School Dist. No. RE-2, 152 Colo. 596, 384 P.2d 82 (1963) Boyer v.
Iowa Hign School Athletic Ass'n., 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606 (1964) Weisner v. Bd.
of Educ.. 237 Md. 391, 206 A.2d 560 (1965) Russell v. Edgewood Independent School Dist.,
4t-6 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464
(1964).
11. E.g.. Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
12. 2 , U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2674, 2680.
13. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). In Colorado
Racing Conim'n. v. Brush Racing Ass'n., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957) the Supreme
Court of Colorado made broad statements abolishing all governmental immunity which it
later retracted over strong dissent in cases like Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d
609 (196o).
14. E.g., Muskopf v. Corning Iosp. Dist., 55 Cal. App.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d
457 (1961) Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) Haney v. City
of Lexington. supra note 11 Walsh v. Clark County School Dist., 419 P.2d 774 (Nev.
1966) Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
15. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
16. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
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tionale that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury
than that the public should suffer an inconvenience, ' '1 7 and the
fear that there would be an infinity of actions with no fund out of
which to pay such judgments.' s The courts also have reasoned that
the school district was merely an agent of the state in the adminis-
tration of the great public charity of education and thus it would
be unfair to impose liability which would severely curtail an agency
serving the public without profit.,2 From this developed the pro-
tection of public funds theory which today is without justification
since a governmental unit like a school district is financially capable
of carrying such liability 20 or of buying liability insurance. Al-
though liability or the payment of premiums for insurance means
additional expense, this factor should be accepted and borne as
the cost of administration. 21
Many jurisdictions now base the continuation of the rule upon
stare decists and the theory that the legislature and not the court
normally determines public policy 22 In spite of the realization that
the burden on the individual is too great in an area where the
government s expanding and that education is a big business, the
courts feel bound because as one justice complained: "We are not
writing on a clean slate; we are dealing with the law as established
and developed after years of growth. ' 23 Indeed, the slate
may be filled with assorted statutes, constitutional problems, and
distinctions of the court itself.
The vocal minority, however, has acknowledged that liability
is the rule and immunity is the exception, and that where policy
and justice for such immunity does not exist it should be abolished.24
An example of such judicial action is found m Spanel v Mounds
View School Distrct No. 621.2 In that case the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held the school district immune for its tort, but stated,
although necessarily dicta, its intention to overrule the immunity
of all political subdivisions after the next legislature adjourned.
26
This prospective overruling had the effect of maintaining the
17. Russell v. Men of Devon, supra note 15 at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362 (Ashhurst, J.).
18. Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362 (Lord Kenyon, Ch. J.).
19. Ford v. School Dist' 121 Pa. 543, 15 AtI. 812 (1888).
20. See generally Muskopf v. Corning Hoap. Dist., supra note 14.
21. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 l1.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 968.
22. E.g., Weisner v. Bd. of Educ., 237 Md. 391, 206 A.2d 560 (1965).
23. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., supra note 21, at 102.
24. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) Holytz v.
City of Milwaukee, supra note 14, at 622-25.
25. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
26. Id. at 803. The exact statement is. "[T]he court is unanimous in expressing its
intention to ovrrule the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity as a defense with respect
to tort claims against school districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of
government on whom immunity has been conferred by judicial decislon arising after the
next Minnesota Legislature adjourns, subject to any statutes which now or hereafter limit
or regulate lhe prosecution of such claims." The court further qualifled the statement to
the effe,'i that it would not apply to discretionary, legislative or Judicial functions of such
units.
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certainty of the law and the reliance upon it. Its abrogation as to
all subdivisions enabled the court to avoid the complexities and un-
certainties of piecemeal abrogation. Its prospective date would give
the legislature the opportunity to implicitly approve of the change,
and in the event the legislature decided to act, the court indicated
areas to which the legislature might address itself.
Within six months the legislature acted to define the tort liability
of political subdivisions. 2 7 Although continuing the school districts'
immunity to a future date, 28 the legislature provided for voluntary
liability insurance.2 9 Thus the court's creative action worked as a
catalyst to bring about a partial change of the rule.80 In other
states the courts have followed a number of approaches,3' although
in many aspects similar to that of Minnesota. This creative role
has been approved by a number of authorities and urged upon
other courts.
3 2
The law of North Dakota is in accord with the instant case.
Early in the state's history the court applied the common law rule
to municipal corporations 3 finding that the people, attempting to
establish homes and communities in this State, would be over-
burdened by such liability, and therefore the rights of the individual
must give way to the greater right. The governing case as to school
districts' 4 also reasoned that the public interest must come before
individual rights in order to insure the proper continuation of the
schools. However, since these cases were decided, there have been
great changes in the economic and social conditions of our society;
the reason for the rule is no longer valid. Recently, in an analogous
situation, the North Dakota Supreme Court in reviewing the doc-
trine of charitable immunity found that it was never established in
the state and that there was no valid reason for giving such
immunity to a charity now.' 5
27. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 466 (1963). This chapter with certain exceptions made mu-
nicipal corporations liable and set up special methods of procedure, including maximum
liability limits.
2S. MIN. SEss. LAWS 1963 ch. 798, § 12. This provision would have terminated in
196b, but the date was extended to 1970; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.12(4) (Supp. 1965).
29. MIX.XN. STAT. ANN. § 466.12(3) (1963).
SL,. 48 MINN. L. Rv. 198 (1963), Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in
the Reform of Tort Law, snfra note 32.
'I. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, aupra note 21 (The court's
overruling was board and prospective, allowing recovery in the case before them) Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. App.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961) (Although
scnool districts were liable prior to the decision, this is an example of board abrogation
and retrospective application as to areas that the legislature has not defined) Holytz v.
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (The court allowed recovery in
this case, but made its broad application effective with reference to a future date) , Stone
v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., supra note 24 (Following the example of California, the
court abolished governmental immunity to the state as wen as to subdivisions and applied
it retrospectively).
32. Green, Freedom of Litigation pts. 1 & 3, 38 ILL. L REv. 117, 355 (1943-44) Peck,
The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. Rav.
265 (1963).
33. Vail v. Town of Amenia, 4 N.D. 239, 59 N.W 1092 (1894).
34. Anderson v. Bd. of Educ., 49 N.D. 181, 190 N.W 807 (1922).
35. Granger v. Deaconess Hosp., 138 N.W.2d 443 (N.D. 1965).
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Although reform is needed in North Dakota, any judicial action
on the subject seems to be severely limited by a constitutional pro-
vision which states that:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay Suits may be
brought against the state in such manner, in such courts,
and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law,
direct. 86
The North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that the second
sentence of the provision is controlling and that the legislature
alone has the right to decide the question of governmental im-
munity 37 In so doing, the court has found legislative intent for the
continuation of the rule in individual statutes" and in particular
a recent enactment authorizing the purchase of liability insurance
by subdivisions. "9 Thus, in the absence of an express statute pro-
viding for a cause of action the court has held that a municipal
corporation4 ) or a park district 1 in the performance of its govern-
mental function was immune in tort. Likewise, it can be argued
that a school district as a political subdivision is immune in tort
under this interpretation.
Nevertheless, there may be another interpretation of this con-
stitutional provision. The absolute language of the first sentence
indicates that liability is the rule and that there is no presumption
of immunity The second sentence gives the legislature the power
to grant immunity to those state agencies it chooses to protect
and to provide special procedures in which the cause of action may
be brought and determined. Thus it can be argued that where the
legislature has not granted by express statute immunity to a politi-
cal subdivision liability exists. Other courts have interpreted similar
provisions in their constitutions as not applicable in overruling the
school districts' immunity 42 If the court does decide to change its
interpretation of this provision, a school district may become liable
through judicial action in the absence of legislative prohibition. Of
couse such judicial action is not preferable to the legislative process
36. N.D. CONST. § 22 (1889).
37. Speilman v. State of North Dakota, 91 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-42-01 to 40-42-03, 40-42-05 (1960).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-43-07 (Supp. 1965). "This section shall not deprive any
political subdivision of the state of its right to claim governmental immunity "
40. Kaczor v. City of Minot, 138 N.W.2d 784, (N.D. 1965).
41. Fetzer v. Minot Park Dfist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
42. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 56 Cal. App.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d
457, 460-61 (1961) Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wls.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1962).
In Illinois, the court In overruling a school district's immunity did not find that ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 26, which states that "[tihe state of Illinois shall never be made defend-
ant in any court of law or equity," applied. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.
No. 302, i8 nli.2d 11, 168 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
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which is more flexible and which can with ease resolve the problem.
However, with the continuing and growing necessity for a more
equitable solution to the problem in the absence of legislative
action, the court, may eliminate the presumption of immunity which
it has established thus following the Minnesota example.
THEODORE ABE
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-EXECUTION OF WAR-
RANTS-LIMITATIONS ON OFFICERS EXECUTING A WARRANT-The de-
fendant was suspected of bookmaking. Two county detectives in
plain clothes, armed with two search warrants and one arrest war-
rant, approached his home, knocked once on the door, waited about
a minute and, after receiving no response from within, began to
apply a crowbar to the door The defendant opened the door before
they proceeded any further, and they were allowed a peaceable
entry Subsequently the detectives identified themselves and read
the warrants. Upon searching the premises they found and confis-
cated several blank sheets of paper and two newspapers containing
horseracing forms. During this time they answered phone calls
for the defendant in which the callers wished to place bets on horses.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with two judges dissenting,'
affirmed a conviction for setting up a gambling establishment and
for bookmaking, while denying the defendant's contention that the
evidence obtained in the search was inadmissible due to the detec-
tives' failure to announce their purpose and authority prior to forcible
entry The court said that the defendant opened the door volun-
tarily and entry was therefore gained peaceably Thus the ensuing
search was lawful and the evidence obtained therefrom was admis-
sible. Commonwealth v Ametrane, 422 Pa. 83, 221 A.2d 296 (1966)
The present case raises a question as to the extent that law
enforcement officers may go and yet remain within established
boundaries of lawful searches and seizures carried out under a
warrant. With regard to the instant case it has been held that the
execution of a warrant is lawful if entry is peaceful and there is
no breaking of parts of the house.2 The defendant here did allow
the officers to enter peacefully, although the results of the ensuing
1. Eagen and Musmanno, J. Musmanno dissented strongly, stating that never before
has he felt It more necessary to write a dissenting opinion. He said that entry under
such condition was illegal, "as if without encountering resistance the officers had reduced
the door to splinters." He went on to say that the evidence should have been suppressed
not only because of illegal entry, but because the search warrants were not issued upon
probable cause.
2. United States v. Bowman, 137 F.Supp. 385 (D.D.C, 1956).
